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Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is now a
global public health threat with many medical, ethical,
social, economic, political, and legal implications. The non-
specific signs and symptoms of this disease, coupled with
a relatively long incubation period and the initial absence of
a reliable diagnostic test, limited the understanding of the
magnitude of the outbreak. This paper outlines our experi-
ence with public health issues that have arisen during this
outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong. We confirmed that case
detection, reporting, clear and timely dissemination of infor-
mation, and strict infection control measures are essential
in handling such an infectious disease outbreak. The need
for an outbreak response unit is crucial to combat any
future outbreak. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) originated in
November 2002 in the Guangdong Province of China
and, by February 2003, had spread to Hong Kong and sub-
sequently to 32 other countries or regions, infecting
approximately 8,459 patients and resulting in >800 deaths
(1). The overall mortality rate is approximately 14% to
15%, ranging from <1% in persons <24 years of age to
>50% in persons >65 years of age (2). The cause of SARS
is not yet confirmed, but a novel coronavirus has been
identified and resembles the virus found in civet cats (3,4).
SARS is the latest in a series of new infectious diseases
(e.g., HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Nipah, and Avian H5N1 influen-
za) that are adding additional stress to a healthcare system
already dealing with the resurgence of established condi-
tions (e.g., dengue, malaria, and tuberculosis). As global
air travel is now commonplace and has facilitated the inter-
national spread of SARS, identifying and globally publi-
cizing the lessons learned from the latest outbreak are
important. 
Risk Factors for Spread of SARS
Mode of Transmission
The mechanism of transmission of the agent or agents
causing SARS is not yet fully understood but is probably
mainly by droplet secretions, fomites, or person-to-person
contact. To date, no evidence of airborne transmission
exists. In the Amoy Gardens outbreak in Hong Kong,
aerosolization of fecal waste contaminated with the SARS
agent has also been proposed to have contributed to trans-
mission. The virus has been reported to be stable in feces
and urine at room temperature for at least 1–2 days, and up
to 4 days in stool from patients experiencing diarrhea (5).
After drying on plastic surfaces, the virus can survive for
up to 48 hours, although commonly used disinfectants and
fixatives are effective against it (5).
Super-spreading patients may play a role in the spread
of the disease. For instance, the Hong Kong index patient
is thought to have infected persons who transmitted the
virus worldwide, subsequently resulting in outbreaks of
>300 patients in Amoy Gardens in Hong Kong and >60
cases in Singapore (6–10). These last two clusters may
have been started by two persons undergoing hemodialy-
sis. Another hemodialysis patient has been involved in the
transmission of SARS in Toronto; therefore, such patients,
who may have a relatively depressed immune system with
associated high viral loads, may be unduly facilitating
transmission of the virus. A more direct role of hemodial-
ysis patients in the spread of viral infections has been pre-
viously observed in Edinburgh, Scotland, in the late 1960s,
where transmission of hepatitis B was associated with
mortality rates of 24% and 31% in renal patients and staff
members, respectively (11). 
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Procedures, such as the use of ventilators and nebulized
bronchodilators, have been reported to have led to spread
by droplet transmission and aerosolization of virus-con-
taining particles (12,13). Similarly other procedures, such
as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, use of positive airway
pressure devices, bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation,
airway suction, and sputum suction are thought to increase
risk for infection (7). Although the use of such equipment
in the treatment of most pneumonias, except influenza,
presents no risk to staff, the emergence of SARS has
thrown into sharp focus the general safety of such routine
practices, particularly when dealing with novel infectious
agents. The SARS outbreak is unique in its propensity to
infect healthcare workers; for instance, in China approxi-
mately 20% of cases are in healthcare workers, and early
in the outbreak the rate was closer to 90% (14,15).
Simple measures such as hand washing after touching a
patient, the use of an appropriate and well-fitted facemask,
and the introduction of infection control measures at an
early stage, as well as quarantine of patients, may have
reduced transmission (12). Restricting visitors to the hos-
pital would further reduce the risk for transmission into the
community. However, despite stringent use of full infec-
tion control procedures, breakthrough cases of SARS still
occurred in healthcare workers.
Coronavirus infections have been reported to infect
lymphocytes, reducing their numbers in the Hong Kong
patients by 30% (13). Immune-mediated cellular damage
to the lungs has been reported (7) and has prompted the use
of steroids in these patients. Given the role of super-
spreading patients (10), who have relatively depressed
immune systems, steroid use may further increase the viral
load and prolong shedding of viable viral particles past the
1–2 weeks after symptoms disappear, potentially increas-
ing the transmission of the disease and the duration of
infectivity of the patient.
Complexity of the SARS Outbreak
Two overlapping sets of disease signs and symptoms
have been reported, with some patients having varying
degrees of enteric disease. Patients from China and at a
number of Hong Kong hospitals have had relatively low
rates of diarrhea (10% to 20%) (3,13), whereas patients
from Amoy Gardens and Canada have had higher rates,
50% to 70% (9,16,17). Some of these differences may
result from the timing of data collection, with collection of
data later in the course of the patient’s illness including
symptoms of diarrhea that may be associated with antibi-
otic therapy. However, these data suggest that possible dif-
ferences in the mode of transmission, such as respiratory
droplet compared to fecal-oral, or differences in the speci-
ficity of the organism to the respiratory or gastrointestinal
tracts may also be present. Mutations in isolates from res-
piratory or gastrointestinal tracts from the same cattle
infected with coronavirus have been previously reported
(18); such mutations may contribute to the observed differ-
ences in symptoms. 
The nonspecific disease signs and symptoms, long
mean incubation period (6.4 days), long time between
onset of symptoms and hospital admission (from 3 to 5
days) (6), and lack of a reliable diagnostic test in the early
phase of the illness (19) can lead to potential transmission
to frontline healthcare workers and the community.
Similarly, the signs and symptoms in elderly patients, in
whom the primary disease phase may be muted without
evident fever, may further contribute to the spread of
SARS. Additionally, as with other diseases, misdiagnosis
can have fatal consequences. For example, in 2001, an air-
line cabin crew member infected with malaria was misdi-
agnosed by two physicians, who did not identify the fact
that she had recently traveled to a malaria-endemic area
(20). She was treated for a common cold and died within 1
week of a malaria diagnosis by a tropical medicine special-
ist. Misdiagnosis of a case of SARS, particularly in a
super-spreader in whom the disease symptoms may differ,
could lead to rapid dissemination through the population.
The nonspecific features and lack of an early diagnostic
test have also led to difficulty of diagnosis with a potential
threat to the community if such patients are discharged. 
Disseminating Information
The accuracy and timeliness of the reporting and dis-
semination of data relating to SARS are important issues
affecting public perception, and hence, fear, as well as the
implementation of programs to limit spread of the disease.
Inadequate reporting of cases (21) may have hindered
implementation of preventative measures. Similarly,
media attention, which plays a major role in the wide-
spread dissemination of information, has a tendency to
sensationalize information, leading to misconceptions over
community preventative strategies, government and insti-
tutional procedures, and the magnitude of the outbreak. On
the other hand, lack of information led to the development
of public myths, with people in Guangdong believing that
boiling white vinegar would protect them from infection
and leading to carbon monoxide poisoning from charcoal
burning to heat the vinegar (22). 
Challenges to the Medical Community 
and Future Directions
SARS presents formidable challenges to the healthcare
community with medical, social, political, legal, and eco-
nomic implications. All countries have to be prepared at a
number of levels to deal with the threat posed by the SARS
epidemic and any other novel infectious disease. The
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has emphasized the need for stringent infection control
measures in hospitals on a regular basis, in anticipation of
the next epidemic. While the measures may be in place, are
we sure that they are being properly implemented at all
times? 2) Healthcare workers should always follow sim-
ple, but stringent hygienic practices (e.g., washing hands
before and after seeing a patient, even when no epidemic
is apparent). 3) Appropriate history taking, to obtain
important information, such as recent travel history or con-
tacts with possibly infected persons, when a patient with a
fever is seen, could help to quickly identify persons at risk
and reduce spread. 4) Given the association with a number
of super-spreaders and renal dialysis patients, strict quar-
antine procedures should be implemented if such persons
are suspected of having SARS. 5) The concepts of speci-
ficity and sensitivity need to be widely understood and
applied. Although the need for rapid diagnostic tests is
important, introducing tests with inadequate sensitivity
and unknown specificity should be prevented, as the data
cannot be interpreted. A negative test does not always
exclude a disease, and discharging patients later diagnosed
and readmitted could have serious consequences. 6) The
use of high-risk medical procedures that may inadvertent-
ly spread the disease through aerosolization of the agent
should be evaluated with potential new diseases in mind.
Other high-risk procedures should also be reconsidered
with regard to infection control to limit risk from the use
of intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and positive
airway pressure devices. 7) Quarantine and isolation pro-
cedures and contact tracing need to be instituted early in
the outbreak, and access to hospitals treating such patients
needs to be restricted to limit spread into the community.
8) Environmental hygiene needs to be maintained. In the
wake of the SARS outbreak, the Hong Kong government
has introduced a number of measures to improve public
hygiene, including closely monitoring the integrity of
sewage disposal systems (deficiencies that were a possible
source of the Amoy Gardens outbreak). The government
has increased penalties for spitting, which still remains a
commonplace habit.
As with the outbreak of avian influenza, in which
humans became infected through the purchase of live poul-
try, a process that still continues, the SARS virus appears
to have been contracted from an animal source (possibly
civet cats [23]) used for human consumption. Close con-
tact between humans and animal vectors in the southern
China region has been responsible for a number of epi-
demics, including influenza A. A reduction in exposure to
animal viral reservoirs should reduce the occurrence of
such events. To that end, the Chinese government has
increased implementation of laws that prevent the con-
sumption of wild animals. 
Timely communication and exchange of complete,
accurate information are important during any epidemic.
Difficulties in obtaining information from all relevant
sources could delay appropriate analyses, reporting of the
situation, and implementation of necessary actions. Plans
for integration of appropriate agencies should be made in
advance of any epidemic. The data collected should be
two-tiered to include essential information required to con-
trol the outbreak, such as clinical details and contact infor-
mation, as well as more detailed data that will enable
ongoing or retrospective evaluation to determine, for
instance, mode of transmission, which remains uncon-
firmed.
An epidemic like SARS has an impact on many sectors
of the society. Leadership is essential to coordinate activi-
ties and information dissemination in order to minimize
confused messages and public panic. Coordination should
be maintained with all relevant sectors including the health
professionals, policymakers, community leaders, media,
and the public.
Early detection and handling systems need to be con-
solidated to prepare for future epidemics. To this end, the
Hong Kong government has announced the allocation of
HK$1 billion (US$1=HK$7.8) to fund a center for disease
control. The role for the center remains to be clarified but
should include monitoring for novel infections and
research into existing agents. The center should also
include an outbreak response unit that can be called on to
spearhead coordinated action in a timely manner. The team
should include infectious disease and public health spe-
cialists, epidemiologists, media spokespersons, adminis-
trators with suitable connections to frontline healthcare
units, and other statutory bodies to enable collation and
dissemination of important information and risk communi-
cation to relevant stakeholders. The unit will require leg-
islative power to enable the rapid initiation of control
measures both in the hospitals and the community.
As no prophylaxis vaccination or specific proven treat-
ment is yet available against SARS, prevention is the only
measure that one can take to prevent epidemics.
Communicating the risks and preventive measures in an
effective and acceptable manner is important.
SARS has had a significant impact on the local health-
care system; a high proportion of patients require intensive
care, coupled with prolonged hospitalization, overloading
the system. Similarly, the ready transmission to hospital
care workers reduced the availability of knowledgeable
healthcare workers to treat other patients and colleagues,
and this further limited the ability of the hospitals to cope
with the current outbreak. In summary, the current SARS
outbreak provides a timely reminder of the importance of
maintaining basic healthcare practices at all times so that,
when the next new disease strikes, we are well prepared to
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the healthcare sector should be a priority with appropriate
resources.
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